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Abstract—One option to counteract anthropogenic climate change 
is to increase the share of renewable electricity supply. Current 
market structures provide only a limited framework for the creation 
of “green” electricity tariffs, which are often criticised as 
“greenwashing”, lacking transparency, and ineffective invest-ment 
signalling. This paper defines and discusses a day-ahead spot market 
for tradable (short-term) time-specific renewable energy certificates 
(REC). Implementing an unbundled spot market for REC promises a 
more credible provision of renewable electricity, along with a 
mechanism rewarding flexibility in renewable production and storage 
as well as tangible investment signals. 
 
Keywords—Time-specific Renewable Energy Certificates, Green 
Power Tariffs, Market Design, Plug-in Electric Vehicles 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Growing climate concerns lead to more restrictive carbon 
standards for passenger vehicles all around the globe, the current 
discussion about a zero-emission quota in China is only the most 
recent of these developments. The industry shifts towards alter-
native fuels, most notably plug-in electric vehicles (PEV). How-
ever, this approach can only guarantee a more sustainable mobility 
if the electricity used for charging comes from renew-able sources. 
Some progress has been made in the last decades, but most major 
vehicle markets are struggling to achieve significant carbon 
reductions in electricity production [1].  
In addition to increasing the cumulative availability of green 
electricity, vehicle charging should be synchronised with 
renewable feed-in time: the surplus demand from PEV charging 
requires additional power generation at that time, often from fossil 
fuels. In consequence, consumers’ real-time electricity mix varies 
greatly from the mix communicated in their green power tariffs [2]. 
These increased marginal emissions are allocated to all consumers 
via the current energy-only market (EoM). Long vehicle idling 
times of typically up to 23 h per day  
[3] allow PEV to react to volatile renewable supply. By shifting 
charging periods to times of renewable production, power demand 
would increase in times of renewable oversupply instead of in often 
carbon-intensive peak demand periods [4].  
Today, green power marketing either relies on over-the-counter 
contracts with generators, or on renewable energy certi-ficates 
(REC). REC can often be banked (e.g. for three years in California 
[5]) and borrowed, and therefore do not promote time-specific 
consumption. In fact, time-specific information on 
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green power availability is currently not accessible to the 
demand side. Retailers that aim to provide green power from 
predominantly fluctuating wind and solar power – not only to 
PEV – require time-specific signals to incentivise shifting of 
demand, in order to promote consumption at times of abundant 
renewable supply [6,7].  
In a macro-economic context, European REC (or Guarantees 
of Origin) were introduced to capture consumers’ additional 
valuation for sustainable electricity [8]. They are registered and 
monitored at national databases and traded once a week within the 
international European Energy Certificate System (EECS)  
[6]. The traditional (or old) REC-market (oRM) is generally 
criticised for lacking transparency (“greenwashing”) but also for 
its economic ineffectiveness [9]. REC mostly come from large 
hydropower plants in Scandinavia or the Alps. These have 
competitive costs of electricity production and can therefore 
command very low REC-prices (below 1 EUR/MWh in Germany 
[10]). Thus, production from more expensive but sustainable 
sources remains unprofitable and there is no incentive to install 
new capacity – contrary to the effect consumers aim to achieve 
[11]. Due to the low prices of REC, governmental subsidies, e.g. 
the German EEG, were introduced to foster renewable capacity 
expansion [12]. While being successful in increasing capacity, 
these subsidies hamper the competitive marketing of green 
electricity [13,14]. To improve transparency, certification agencies 
have constructed eco-labels that take additional sustainability 
criteria of green power into account, such as plant age or 
transparent business practices, but tracking their subtle differences 
is tedious for consumers [15].  
A suitable market mechanism could replace inefficient 
subsidies with long-term, market-based incentives for renewable 
generation and offer opportunities for smart charging. This work 
aims to facilitate the time-specific provision of renewable energy 
through proposing a day-ahead voluntary spot market for time-
specific REC (tsRM), from the point of view of (but not exclusive 
to) Germany. After reviewing related literature, we define the 
market by applying the framework of Market Engineering, discuss 
its merits and drawbacks, and conclude. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
A considerable amount of research discusses demand side 
management in the context of increasing renewable power 
production [e.g. 16,17], the significance of PEV [e.g. 18], and 
the necessary tools for its implementation [e.g. 19]. However, 
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very little attention is payed to the market structure facilitating 
such services – especially in the transition phase until current 
subsidy mechanisms have run out or need to be replaced, and 
truly disrupting shares of renewable production need to be 
included in the power system: While Jensen & Skytte (2002) 
[20] and Ciarreta et al. (2014) [13] generally promote REC 
markets over subsidy schemes, Morthorst (2000) [21] suggests 
to allow banking of REC beyond a one year period to moderate 
volatility. Oppositely, Schaeffer & Sonnemans (2000) [22] add 
that unlimited banking could lead suppliers to coordinate on 
higher prices. More recently, Leprich et al. (2015) [6] collect 
ideas for remodelling existing market structures to improve 
green power marketing and time-specific trade in ¼-hour 
granularity. Lemming (2003) [23] scrutinises the traditional 
REC-quota system for wind power and sheds light on resulting 
risk exposure and risk-premiums. Bertoldi & Huld (2006) [24] 
describe  a  joint  market  for  REC  and  energy  efficiency 
certificates (incl. quota) with shorter validity periods but still 
allow banking and borrowing of REC. Paulun (2011) [25] 
discusses capacity investment decisions in general and 
concludes that tradeable REC can contribute as investment 
incentives for renewable capacity. He also suggests moving 
towards more time-specific REC. Decentralised solutions, with 
direct and live sale of green power, e.g. from local 
photovoltaics, have recently been receiving more and more 
attention [e.g. 26] 
In 2012 the Austrian market platform EXAA introduced an 
hourly day-ahead market for green power (certified energy from 
renewable  sources,  beyond  unbundled  REC),  the  Green- 
Power@EXAA. For market entry, suppliers need to certify 
individual or a pool of plants with the “Erzeugung EE+” label 
and their final product with the “EE02” label, both issued by 
TÜVSüd. Prices were on average 2.2 % (0.7 EUR/MWh) above 
the price level on the corresponding grey power market in 2015. 
This small premium for time-specific renewable electricity can 
be attributed to the predominance of supply by Scandinavian 
hydropower. Likely in order to reduce suppliers’ risk exposure, 
the GreenPower auction takes place shortly before the regular 
day-ahead auction, so that unsold energy can still be sold 
without its “renewable” attribute. In consequence, the two 
markets are highly correlated in their price variations 
(ρgreen,grey > 0.879 for 2015). The market reached its peak 
liquidity in 2015 with an annual sales volume of 31.6 GWh 
(compared to 8.2 TWh on the Austrian grey power day-ahead 
market). However, trade has ceased since July of 2016 [27]. The 
likely cause is a lack of demand due to customers’ differing 
valuation of green power characteristics (origin, technology, 
plant age, etc.) beyond “EE02”1. 
Countries with a diverse renewable portfolio could introduce 
a similar mechanism to pool liquidity of unbundled REC-sales 
but with a stronger orientation towards volatile sources and 
away from large hydropower. By unbundling REC from power 
offers, market entry barriers could be lowered for new players, 
e.g. aggregators of flexible demand from PEV, electric heating 
or cooling or even power-to-gas [17]. Additionally, an 
unbundled market gives specific information on the valuation 
for sustain ability, without dilution by power valuation.  
 
 
 
1 Source: Direct correspondence with the VERBUND AG, a major actor 
on GreenPower@EXAA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  METHOD: THE FRAMEWORK OF MARKET ENGINEERING 
 
In order for a market to allocate resources efficiently, it needs 
to be consciously designed with respect to rules on information 
disclosure, signalling and allocation. Market Engineering after 
Weinhardt et al. (2003) [28] uses legal frameworks, economic 
and management science models and information and 
telecommunication technologies to design markets for the 
exchange of goods and services. It is often – but not exclusively 
– used for the design of electronic markets [e.g. 29]. 
Fig. 1 shows the framework of Market Engineering in its 
generalised form. A market is always embedded in its socio- 
economic and legal environment. The market engineer has no 
direct influence on the environment but can design transaction 
objects, the market structure and auxiliary services in order to 
incentivise participants’ (i.e. agents’) behaviour towards 
achieving a certain measurable market outcome or 
performance. The transaction objects are the goods or services 
traded on the market. The market structure consists of the 
microstructure (allocation and  pricing rules),  the  infrastructure  
(enabling transactions), and the business structure (e.g. trading 
fees as a business model for the market operator). Auxiliary 
services can provide decision support for market participants 
[30]. 
  
IV.  DEFINING A NEW SPOT MARKET FOR 
UNBUNDLED REC 
In the following, we apply the framework of Market 
Engineering to design a time-specific day-ahead REC market 
(tsRM) [28,30]. Fig. 2 displays an overview of the intended 
market structure. The grey dot represents the virtual flow of 
electricity, the green circle a time-specific REC. Information 
exchange with the REC-registry is shown in dashed lines. 
  
A. Desired market outcome 
REC generally are a useful tool for marketing green elec- 
tricity: Since a full-time supply of renewable power directly 
from a specified source is costly for individual customers, REC 
allow for trading the characteristic “renewable” independent of 
physical power, while preventing double-marketing. The goal 
of a day-ahead market for time-specific REC is to provide an 
efficient price for renewable electricity at the specific time of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  The framework of Market Engineering [30] 
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Fig. 2 Structure of the time-specific day-ahead REC market (tsRM). 
 
 
production. Suppliers would be able to capture customers’ 
additional valuation for sustainable power supply and contribute to 
covering their investment cost for renewable capacity [31]. 
 
B. Socio-economic and legal environment 
 
A fundamental prerequisite for a tsRM is a positive willing-
ness-to-pay (WTP) for green power with a high temporal 
resolution. A positive WTP, albeit small, has been found [e.g. 
11,32], often accredited to green consumer values [e.g. 33]. This 
demand will only increase with growing PEV numbers. 
 
The supply of renewable power has increased dramatically, 
especially in Europe and China. The example of Germany shows 
how important REC trading is today: Almost 20 % of German 
households receive green power – together with business cus-
tomers this represents an energy demand of around 50 TWh  
[34]. However, it is estimated that for 2012 only 19 % of the green 
power consumption via REC actually came from German power 
plants. The REC are rather imported from Scandinavian and alpine 
hydropower plants [35,36]. Most of Germany’s re-newable 
capacity growth, especially wind and solar power, was directly 
subsidised and is therefore not eligible for REC. The abundant, 
cheap hydropower imports severely reduce REC-prices and push 
less plannable production out of the market [10]. 
 
The legislative basis for REC trading in Europe is the EU-
directive 2009/28/EG [37], which defines the EECS and is 
translated into national legislations with national issuing bodies 
and registration mechanisms. Key information recorded for 
REC are the date of creation, source technology, plant location 
and size, date of plant construction and financial support. So 
far, REC can be banked for up to one year [38]. 
 
A tsRM should be based largely on existing REC and 
liberal-ised EoM such as in central Europe as the potential 
stakeholders of a day-ahead REC market would already have 
extensive experience with the regulatory framework conditions. 
Neverthe-less, liquidity might be threatened due to oversupply 
and low demand for time-specific REC [cf. 39]. The design 
process aims to address this problem. 
C. Transaction object 
 
A REC (or Guarantee of Origin) is the transaction object of 
the market, calculated in 1 MWh, and largely unchanged to its 
current definition as given above. The specific time of creation 
and a “stored”-identifier are the only additions. The latter 
indicates if a REC is being stored (e.g. in a pumped -storage 
hydro power plant, PEV or stationary battery). A more detailed 
discussion on storage is given in subsections D and F. 
 
D. Market structure 
 
The proposed microstructure is largely derived from the 
existing day-ahead EoM: utilities sell their renewable electricity 
output on the EoM while receiving REC with a time-stamp of 
generation. Time-specific REC are issued and monitored by 
national registration institutions and can be exchanged via a unified 
protocol. Suppliers place them on the market for the expected feed-
in time (e.g. based on wind prognosis) for the following day. Only 
REC from plants outside of governmental incentive programs can 
be sold, in order to reward investments according to actual demand 
for green electricity. 
 
Retailers buy REC to cover their projected customer demand, 
immediately cancelling the REC upon purchase. All market 
participants must maintain a balancing group to ensure balanced 
supply and demand of REC at all times. At time of de-livery, 
groups with too few REC for time-specific demand must 
compensate their customers for breach of contract. Surplus time-
specific REC are not eligible for the oRM and expire unused. 
 
In addition, storage plays a pivotal role for the system inte-
gration of volatile renewables. Since the tsRM is designed to un-
bundle REC from electricity, storages must be able to store both, 
the physical energy and the time-specific REC. Storage opera-tors 
must only be able to sell REC to the tsRM if they prove to have 
previously bought REC for storing. This requires a kind of tag only 
available to certified storage operators, in order to pre-vent the 
automatic cancellation (i.e. use) of REC upon purchase by a 
storage operator. A time-specific REC therefore has three states: 
created, stored, and cancelled (cf. Fig. 2). When a REC is being 
discharged the specific time is recorded. This discharge time stamp 
is used for validating the REC upon cancellation. 
 
The bids (e.g. in EUR/MWh) are aggregated into a merit-
order for every trading interval (Fig. 3). The market is cleared 
for e.g. every hour with the uniform price of the marginal bid. 
The interval should be shortened after a defined adaptation 
period to provide more flexibility for storage and volatile wind 
and solar production. The tsRM-auction should be scheduled 
shortly before the day-ahead EoM in order to allow flexible 
suppliers to adapt their EoM-bids in case of unexpected tsRM 
outcomes. Otherwise, the risk of mismatching allocations for 
power and REC might deter market participation. 
 
The tsRM microstructure has no influence on the current 
infrastructure requirements for power market operation. For 
tariff construction, however, retailers need time-specific, granu-
lar information on expected consumption. This becomes 
particu-larly relevant for large demand from PEV. Thus, Smart 
Meters and charge planners are likely to be a necessity for time-
specific green power contracts [cf. 40]. The infrastructure must 
also allow for the transmission of time-specific price-signals to 
the consumer [cf. 19]. 
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Fees for market participation, i.e. the business structure, can 
follow current business models for market operators, but in the 
beginning should aim to lower market entry barriers to increase 
market liquidity. 
 
E. Auxiliary services 
 
Since the tsRM should be added to existing trading platforms 
of the EoM, auxiliary services specific to trading should be 
available soon, e.g. by adapting or expanding such existing 
technologies as price-forward curve calculators. Since the REC are 
time-specific, some form of very short-term balancing mechanism 
might be made available to unbalanced retailers who want to avoid 
breach-of-contract payments. However, as excess REC simply 
expire, only a positive balancing scheme is neces-sary. 
Alternatively, retailers must buy excess REC to avoid im-balance, 
which would increase prices. Given adequate liquidity, a later 
introduction of an intraday-market could be considered. 
 
F. Agent-behaviour 
 
Due to the similarities between the proposed tsRM and current 
liberalised EoM, most of the mechanics of trading should be well 
established. However, it is important to note, that flexible green 
suppliers must always sell electricity correspond-ing to the sold 
REC, but not the other way around. The decision to act on the tsRM 
therefore strongly depends on the achievable green power 
premium. Since REC have no obligation to be sold and the oRM 
offers a fall-back opportunity, suppliers’ strategies are expected to 
differ: Usually, short-term marginal costs of production are the 
basis for the bid-prices on the EoM. Here, the single-price auction 
regularly leads to prices that also allow covering the fixed costs of 
conventional power plants. In the future, when subsidies for 
renewable production are phased out, the REC-revenues from the 
tsRM could contribute to covering the high fixed costs, which is 
likely to incentivise further investments in volatile sources such as 
wind and solar. 
 
Whether a supplier should be active on the tsRM at all de-pends 
on the expected prices on the EoM and the oRM: If a flexible 
supplier expects higher REC-prices on the tsRM, he bids equal 
capacity to the tsRM and the EoM, but likely at different prices: 
E.g., he might allocate the marginal costs to the tsRM-bid and 
submit a very low bid for power in order to guarantee allocation, 
or vice-versa. Equation (1) shows the idea behind a fleible 
supplier’s (e.g. a biomass plant’s) sell-bid 𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ
∗  in the case of 
higher expected prices on the tsRM compared to the oRM 
(𝐸(𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ) > E(𝑝𝑜𝑅𝑀,𝑤)). Correspondingly, Table I summarieses 
all sell-bids 𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ
∗  and 𝑝𝐸𝑜𝑀,ℎ
∗  (considering expectated price 
relations) on the tsRM and EoM (based on [41]). The variable 
costs of production cvar and the start-up (or cold-start) costs s 
are taken into account. In the case of negative expected 
prices on the EoM , , i.e. a power over-supply, suffi-  
ciently positive tsRM-prices are unlikely, as over-supply situ-
ations are usually caused by strong renewable feed-in at times of 
low demand. For example, high output from subsidised (and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Exemplary merit-order of the time-specific REC market.  
 
thus not tsRM-eligible) wind power could cause EoM-prices to 
plummet, while strong green power demand cannot be met. 
 
The demand side buys power plus REC and pays the sum of 
the market prices, or buys only the power and accepts a breach-of-
contract penalty for insufficient REC-coverage of customer 
demand. A high penalty on the tsRM could motivate storage 
expansion due to a high WTP by the demand side to avoid it. The 
penalty also represents a natural price cap and therefore requires a 
careful design. Equation (2) describes the optimal buy-bid 𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ
∗  
on the time-specific day-ahead REC market for every hour h, under 
consideration of the expected prices on the tsRM 𝐸(𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ) and 
the EoM 𝐸(𝑝𝐸𝑜𝑀,ℎ) 
𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ
∗ = min (
𝐸(𝑝𝐸𝑜𝑀,ℎ) +  𝐸(𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑀,ℎ) 
𝐸(𝑝𝐸𝑜𝑀,ℎ) + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦
                           (2) 
 
Furthermore, the role of storages shall be considered in more 
detail: Theoretically, storages are charged when the market price is 
below their costs for storing (depending on purchase price, storage 
efficiency, and grid usage fees) and discharged if these costs are 
compensated. However, such an operation neglects the value of 
future discharge at times of potentially even higher prices. This is 
particularly important for long-term storages (e.g. hydro pump-
storages) and trading activities across multiple markets. A shadow 
price can be calculated that depends on the optional value of future 
discharge [42]. The storage is charged if the sum of the expected 
prices on tsRM and EoM is projected to be below the shadow price 
of charging, and discharged if the sum is above the shadow price 
of discharging. Bids are placed accordingly, although the differing 
consumption obligations for tsRM and EoM have again to be taken 
into account. Since the oRM is not open to storages, there is no fall-
back option. 
 
Due to the supposed premium and higher price volatility on 
the tsRM, storage operators have an immediate incentive to 
store green power instead of grey power and exploit periods of 
abundant volatile feed -in. This could provide the means for 
positive business cases for battery storages and flexibility 
aggre-gators of an active demand side.  
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G. Expected market outcome 
 
Low prices are expected for REC from wind, solar, geother-
mal, and hydropower in correspondence with their low marginal 
costs. However, since REC can simply expire unused without 
threatening system stability, unlike electricity, prices below the 
level of conventional, lower-quality REC on the oRM are unlikely 
(cf. Fig. 3). Bids above the tsRM-market-price are only sold at the 
regular spot market; bids below generate a surplus for the provider. 
The demand curve should be significantly less steep than on the 
EoM, as retailers might only want to guarantee partial renewable 
supply or strive to induce demand response. 
 
A considerable price ramp is expected for storage and flexible 
generation due to costs of storage or time -dependent biofuel costs. 
Biomass plant operation has to take harvesting periods into 
account, which could lower tsRM prices in autumn. Nevertheless, 
possible price drops on the regular power markets (due to 
favourable wind and sun conditions) might cause flexible bidders 
to lower their tsRM-bids to stay in the market. In general, the 
correlation between tsRM and EoM is expected to be high. On the 
other hand, if a power price drop has other causes, flexible bidders 
might consider increasing REC-bids in order to compensate. This 
commands further research. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
The proposed unbundled day-ahead market for time-specific 
REC enables retailers to supply higher-quality renewable 
electricity at the true time of production to customers with a 
valuation for improved sustainability. Demand response aggre-
gators, e.g. for PEV charging, could benefit from a trading plat-
form for REC independent of customers’ private power tariff. 
However, in the case of diverging trends on EoM and tsRM, the 
aggregator must carefully decide which steering signal to relay to 
customers, depending on the agreed service level (i.e. partial or 
total guarantee of green power) . Suppliers have the opportunity to 
create additional revenue from their high-quality 
product. The tsRM rewards predictable or flexible renewable 
production and could support the viability of storage business 
cases. Given liquidity and sustained demand, this market could 
play a role in replacing governmental incentive programs in an 
efficient manner as well as provide the tools to incentivise load 
adjustments according to volatile renewable output. 
 
However, the exclusion of subsidised plants or already 
profitable technologies (e.g. large hydropower) might threaten 
liquidity. While beneficial to market functionality and trans-
parency, reducing the supplier pool to exclusively national pro-
duction might be too restrictive, considering that most REC 
used in Germany are sourced internationally [35]. It is similarly 
unclear if the demand for real-time green power is high enough 
for cost-covering prices, despite falling levelised costs of elec-
tricity for wind and solar. This depends on customers’ WTP for 
the added value of real-time feed-in. Additionally, an 
unbundled REC spot market further complicates the dispatch 
for renewable suppliers, especially with respect to the supposed 
interdepend-encies with the EoM. 
 
The proposed market structure leaves the question of price risk 
exposure mostly unanswered for both supply and demand. While 
the supply side can draw from increasingly reliable fore-casts for 
wind and solar power in a day-ahead-setting, retailers might need 
granular Smart Meter data or sophisticated demand response 
measures to be able to predict demand precisely – especially under 
consideration of PEV. Eventually, a framework for long-term risk 
hedging for time-specific REC might be required, i.e. a future 
market analogous to the EoM [cf. 23]. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Marketing of green electricity has so far not reached its full 
potential, since existing valuations by the customers have yet to 
lead to premiums serving as investment incentives to power 
generators. To allow for an efficient provision of green power with 
a reduced propensity for “greenwashing”-critique, we 
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applied the framework of Market Engineering to propose a day-
ahead market for time-specific renewable energy certificates. 
The market was defined and placed in the context of current 
legislation and a first approach towards analysing possible 
bidding strategies was made. 
 
To better understand the implications of the proposed REC 
market and assess its functionality, future research will focus on 
assessing customer understanding and acceptance of the different 
qualities of renewable electricity. Based on this, agent-based 
simulations of power markets will shed light on liquidity and 
performance. Interdependencies between tsRM, EoM and heat 
markets are of particular interest. Due to the significance of price 
expectations, further research could benefit from agent learning 
approaches. The model could be expanded with more short-term 
trading options such as an intraday market or balancing 
mechanisms, or long-term options for risk hedging. A further 
differentiation of power markets with respect to renewable source 
technology could also be considered. 
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